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NEW BRUNSWICK (MINISTER OF HEALTH AND
COMMUNITY SERVICES) V. G. (J.):
EN ROUTE TO MORE EQUITABLE ACCESS
TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM?
PATRICIA HUGHES
RESUME
Dans l'arrt G. (J.), la Cour supreme du Canada a statu6 que les parents sans ressources
dont les enfants risquent d'8tre mis en tutelle dans les procedures de garde ont le droit,
en vertu de 1'article 7 de la Charte, d'8tre repr6sentds par un avocat r6muner6 par
l'ttat, pourvu qu'ils r6pondent A certains crit~res d'admissibilit6 similaires a ceux qui
s'appliquent aux justiciables accuses au criminel et d6sirant recevoir les services d'un
avocat r6mun6r par l'ttat. Relativement A des causes pr~cgdentes invoquant les
int~rets de libert6 et de s6curit6 dcrits A l'article 7, l'auteure aborde la fagon dont G.
(J.) affecte la capacit6 des justiciables sans ressources de retenir les services d'un
avocat du secteur priv6. Elle termine en disant que, bien que l'arrt constitue une
avanc6e importante et que les principes pr~sent6s par la Cour pourraient etre appliqu6s
A d'autres types de causes, il ne touche pas l'aspect syst~mique de l'acc~s au syst~me
juridique. Par cons6quent, I'auteure propose de consid6rer I'article 7 diff6remment et
de donner une nouvelle definition de l'importance de la repr6sentation juridique en
tant qu'616ment essentiel du respect des droits et du droit i des avantages.
I. INTRODUCTION
In G.(J.),1 the Supreme Court of Canada established that parents are constitutionally
entitled to legal representation in child protection proceedings if legal representation
is necessary for a fair proceeding. On the one hand, it contains the potential for greater
access to the legal system by individuals seeking legal aid in civil cases. On the other
hand, the (then) Chief Justice's own summary reflects the limits of the decision:
* Patricia Hughes is Mary Louise Lynch Chair in Women and Law, Faculty of Law, University of
New Bnunswick. The author participated in the preparation of the factum submitted by the Women's
Legal Education and Action Fund, an intervenor before the Supreme Court of Canada in this case.
This paper is based on a presentation to the Osgoode Seminar on Legal Aid held at York University
on November 19, 1999; the Seminar was extremely helpful in considering the place of G.(J.) in the
development of access to legal aid.
1. (1999), 177 D.L.R. (4th) 124 (S.C.C.) (hereinafter "S.C.C. decision"); allowing the appeal from
(1997), 145 D.L.R. (4 ) 349, 187 N.B.R. (2d) 81 (hereinafter "Appeal decision"), affirming (1995),
131 D.L.R. (40) 273, 171 N.B.R. (2d) 185 (N.B.Q.B.) (hereinafter "Trial decision") (cites all to
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When government action triggers a hearing in which the interests protected by s.7
2
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms are engaged, it is under an obliga-
tion to do whatever is required to ensure that the hearing be fair. In some circum-
stances, depending on the seriousness of the interests at stake, the complexity of the
proceedings, and the capacities of the parent, the government may be required to
provide an indigent parent with state-funded counsel. Where the government fails to
discharge its constitutional obligation, a judge has the power to order the govern-
ment to provide a parent with state-funded counsel under s.24(1) of the Charter
through whatever means the government wishes, be it though the Attorney General's
budget, the consolidated funds of the province, or the budget of the legal aid
system, if one is in place.
3
In short, if an interest is protected by section 7 - and this is determined by a rather
torturous parsing exercise - then perhaps someone involved in a civil matter which
involves direct government intervention will be entitled to legal representation at the
hearing.
Although all the judges agreed that parental rights are protected by section 7 and that
under certain circumstances, parents subject to child protection applications are
entitled to legal aid, they divided to some extent in their reasons and, perhaps more
importantly, in their perceptions of impact of the decision. 4 The majority of judges, in
an opinion written by Lamer C.J., while acknowledging the legitimacy of Ms G.'s
claim, frame their reasons narrowly, particularly in contrast with those underlying the
minority opinion.
5
G.(J.) reinforces the individualized approach to determining entitlement to legal
counsel which ignores the crucial role law plays as a system which includes some
people and excludes others in Canada. Gaining access to the legal system in order to
enforce rights is, I suggest, one indicium of contemporary citizenship. Law is perva-
sive in Canadian society and those who can mediate the structure of legal rules and
policies which govern the distribution of goods and benefits and the web of rights and
obligations which govern the relations between government and citizens and citizen
and citizen are at a significant advantage.
2. Section 7 states, "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to
be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." In earlier cases,
while some judges made a determination about the meaning of these sections, these determinations
were not necessary to the decisions because the majority of judges concluded that any infringement
of the right was in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. The most significant of
these cases is B.(R.) v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, which features prominently
in G.(J.) at all levels: [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315. It is discussed below.
3. S.C.C. decision, supra note I, at 131.
4. The Charter violation arises from the actions of a delegated decision-maker, the Law Society, which
used its discretion to not fund custody applications, even though the Legal Aid Act did not expressly
exclude provision of counsel in these cases: ibid. at 158.
5. The majority reasons were those of the Chief Justice and Cory, Major, Gonthier, Binnie JJ and
McLachlin J (as she then was). In addition, a minority of judges, L'Heureux-Dub, Gonthier JJ. and
McLachlin JJ. considered section 15's application to the circumstances raised by these facts.
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We cannot ignore, however, that J.G.'s success in her challenge to one self-contained
aspect of New Brunswick's legal aid plan has resulted in restrictions on the capacity
of government to define the scope of its provision of non-criminal legal aid services.
6
As a result, constitutionally there are some civil matters (child protection applications,
at least) for which governments must provide counsel, where criteria derived from the
criminal cases are satisfied. In other words, there is not an "absolute" right to counsel,
even if the applicant satisfies financial criteria for legal aid; rather the trial judge will
decide whether a parent requires legal representation in order to have a fair hearing.
After outlining the factual and statutory framework of the case, I discuss the reasoning
in some detail, particularly the approach to section 7. I compare the model developed
by the Court to determine when indigent parents are entitled to legal representation to
that applied in the criminal cases. This leads me to a consideration of the implications
of the decision's utility in extending the entitlement to legal counsel in the civil
context; in short, this portion of the discussion considers the parameters of the
constitutionalization of the right to civil legal aid. Finally, I suggest an alternative
method of interpretation of section 7 of the Charter and an alternative approach to the
characterization of legal representation as a means of access to the legal system.
II. THE CONTEXT
A. J.G.'s Experience
J.G. is the mother of three children, living in New Brunswick. The Minister of Health
and Community Services had obtained a six month custody order for her children at
the end of April 1994 (the children having been placed in care in November 1993) and
in October 1994 was seeking an extension of the order for another six months. Ms G.'s
friend had helped her during the two-day hearing into the first application for custody.
This time she wanted a lawyer to represent her in the hearing, but when she applied
to New Brunswick's legal aid program, she was rejected because the New Brunswick
plan did not provide legal aid for parents subject to custody applications by the
Minister, regardless of the parent's financial need. It offered only the advice of duty
counsel prior to going into court. The father of one of the children was able to hire a
lawyer to present his views; the children also had a lawyer (appointed at the direction
of the trial judge) to represent their interests directly; and, of course, the Minister's
case was presented by a lawyer. Ordinarily, someone in Ms G.'s position would be
without equivalent representation at a hearing where the Minister sought to take
custody of her children, even though she was the parent with whom the children lived.
In this instance, however, the lawyer who had been duty counsel, Thomas Christie,
acted pro bono for Ms G. in the custody hearing, 7 without prejudice to her challenge
6. In a different way, this is also the effect of the Winters decision released by the Court a few days after
G.(J.). A case of statutory interpretation rather than constitutional standards, it nevertheless also restricted
the ability of government to decide exactly who should receive legal aid under what circumstances.
Winters v. Legal Services Society (British Columbia) (1999), 177 D.L.R. (4') 94 (S.C.C.).
7. Mr. Christie continued to act for J.G. at each level. J.G. was awarded solicitor-client costs by the
Supreme Court, with respect to proceedings in that Court and the courts below.
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to the plan.8 The trial judge, Athey J., extended the order as requested by the Minister.
By the time the Court of Appeal heard the case in May 1996, Ms G. had once again
gained custody of her children: they had been returned to her in June 1995.
For Ms G., the hearing to deal with the extension of custody held dire implications.
She was aware that the Minister's success in this temporary wardship application could
have serious ramifications for any future guardianship application and the potential
for permanent separation from her children. As she said in her affidavit on her motion
for counsel, "since I am only a party because the Minister feels I cannot provide
adequately for my children, my lack of legal representation will result in the Court
deciding the matter without my having a fair opportunity to challenge the Minster's
claims." 9
B. Child Protection and Legal Aid: The Legislative Schemes
1. Child Protection
The authority of the Minister of Health and Community Services to seek custody or
guardianship of children, found in New Brunswick's Family Services Act, 10 is circum-
scribed by procedural safeguards: the parent is to be told immediately about the action
and the reasons for it; the Minister must decide whether to release the child, make an
agreement about the child's care with the parent or apply for an order within a specified
time; and a hearing is to be held and an order issued within particular time limts. 1
Subsection 53(2) of the Family Services Act directs the judge "at all times [to] place
above all other considerations the best interests of the child." The judge may transfer
"the custody, care and control of the child to the Minister for a period of up to six
months" and may extend an order "for additional periods of up to six months each, up
to a maximum of twenty-four consecutive months."'12 Thus a parent could lose her
children for up to two years without having had a proper opportunity to defend herself
against the claims made by the Minister about her capacities as a parent or to present
the reasons she believed that the children's best interests lay with staying with her.
2. Legal Aid
Legal aid in New Brunswick is provided through a combination of certificates, staff
solicitors and duty counsel. It has, as the majority of the New Brunswick Court of
Appeal commented, "very limited scope."'13 The trial judge was more direct:
8. In addition to her Charter challenge to the plan, Ms G. also unsuccessfully sought an order directing
the Minister to provide her with sufficient funds to cover reasonable fees and disbursements of
counsel with respect to the custody hearing.
9. Trial decision, supra note 1, at 276.
10. Family Services Act, R.S.N.B. c. F-2.2.
11. See in particular sections 51 to 54 of ibid. Although there was no challenge to the Family Services
Act, the majority in the New Brunswick Court of Appeal decided that "the provisions of the Family
Services Act when complied with, as was done in this case, 'ensure reasonable compliance with
constitutional standards' and therefore warrant our deference:" Appeal decision, supra note 1, at 358.
12. Family Services Act, supra note 10, ss.55(l),(2).
13. Appeal decision, supra note 1, at 356. They believed, however, that it was not their function to
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It has been my observation from hearing child protection applications and from
reading reported decisions that numerous Respondents in such proceedings face
many challenges: poverty, single parenthood, economic and social disadvantage and
limited education. I have also observed that some of these parents have themselves
been the victims of abuse or neglect or have not had role models in their youth.
In its Proposed Model for Domestic Legal Aid, November 9,1992, Research
and Planning Branch, New Brunswick Department of Justice said: "This province is
committed to the principle of access to justice. All individuals, regardless of eco-
nomic means, must have the right to fair and equal access to the justice system." In my
view this policy statement is not being adhered to in situations such as this where the
family, the very fabric of our society, is in jeopardy of being torn apart after state
intervention.
14
One lawyer interviewed in a study of New Brunswick's legal aid system described the
plan as "like putting a band-aid on a heart attack" and another commented that'[w]e're
subsidizing a substandard practice of law [which] creates more apprehension and
disrespect for the law among the public."' 15
The Law Society has the authority to establish and administer a legal aid plan (called
Legal Aid New Brunswick). 16 Section 12 of the Act lists the proceedings and prelim-
inary matters for which legal aid certificates may be issued; these include federal and
provincial offences, matters before federal and provincial administrative tribunals,
bankruptcy, matters under the Divorce Act and matters before New Brunswick and
federal courts, including appeals of any matters which could originally be covered by
legal aid. 17 As a matter of practice, only persons charged with a criminal offence
(federal or provincial) will receive legal aid under this component of the plan.
address this question: "the extent of domestic legal aid is a legislative policy making function and
not a Charter question," subject to appropriate monitoring by the courts; this monitoring may be
more stringent in criminal justice matters than in cases involving social legislation: ibid., citing
McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 and RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attor-
ney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, per La Forest J. in each case. The distinction between criminal
and social matters was made in Irwin Toy where it related to the level of scrutiny under section 1:
Attorney General of Quebec v. Irwin Toy, [1989] 1 S.C.R 927. Among other comments by judges of
the Supreme Court on the proper judicial role, the majority cite L'Heureux-Dubd J. in R. v. Prosper,
[[1994] 3 S.C.R. 236: "[T]he scope of services available through Legal Aid is generally not, in my
opinion, for the courts to decide. The proper allocation of state resources is a matter for the legisla-
ture. In its choice of measures, given limited resources, a legislature may prefer to fund victims of
crime rather than accused persons or vice versa - or may wish to reduce rather than increase Legal
Aid funding... "
14. Trial decision, supra note 1, at 284.
15. LEAF-NB, Access to Justice in New Brunswick: The Adverse Impact of Domestic Legal Aid on
Women (September 1996) 24. The author had a role in the production of this study.
16. Legal Aid Act, R.S.N.B., c. L-2, s.2.
17. Certain conditions must be met: for example, the area director cannot issue a certificate for a
summary offence unless there is "a likelihood of imprisonment or loss of means of earning a
livelihood upon conviction," mitigation of penalty is possible or "because of extraordinary circum-
stances, it is in the interests of justice that the applicant be represented by counsel." Also see section
38 of Regulation 84-112 under the Legal Aid Act (O.C.84-497).
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Despite the ostensibly broad provisions of the Legal Aid Act, as already indicated, the
only civil matters for which legal aid is available in New Brunswick are those related
to the family, primarily private custody, support and limited property applications and
child protection applications by the Minister of Health and Community Services. As
of 1993, the Minister of Justice began to administer the domestic legal aid program
through a staff model. Since 1991, the major criterion in private family cases has been
whether the applicant has experienced violence in the domestic relationship; the
exception is that anyone requiring assistance for support orders can obtain it from the
Family Solicitor. 18 While financial eligibility is formally a criterion, in practice it
appears not to be an issue and, in fact, some lawyers have said that they would prefer
that the financial criterion be reimposed. 19 Applicants are screened by the Court Social
Worker. The Family Solicitor gives advice and represents the applicant in court with
respect to interim and regular applications for support or custody, exclusive possession
of the matrimonial home and restraining orders. Although it is possible to obtain
assistance for division of property, this will occur only when the application is
"routine." In addition, where there is no violence involved, the Court Social Workers
may mediate separation or divorce (and write an agreement where appropriate for
review by the Family Solicitor) and in these cases, the Family Solicitor may also
represent one of the partners in a support application. Persons who need representation
to defend themselves in an enforcement hearing for non-payment of support will be
able to obtain a legal aid certificate if they meet the financial criteria and in these cases,
the recipient spouse or parent will be able to obtain assistance from the Family
Solicitor. In private family matters, therefore, there is a minimal service which means
that often the issues relating to family breakup will have to be treated separately
because some are covered by legal aid and some are not.
With the exception of "payors" of support, these matters are dealt with through the
heavily-burdened staff lawyer system, with the assistance of the Court Social Worker.
In order to avoid conflict, however, legal aid in guardianship applications has been
provided by Legal Aid New Brunswick which provides certificates to eligible parents.
Until shortly prior to the Supreme Court's granting of leave in G.(J.), the provision of
legal aid in child protection cases was limited to guardianship applications and was
not available for custody applications, for which the only assistance was duty counsel
advice prior to the hearing. 20 Coverage for Ministerial custody applications was
excluded pursuant to the Law Society's discretion to remove specified kinds of claims
from coverage under the plan, as permitted under subsection 12(14) of the Legal Aid
Act.2 1 The legal aid plan now makes funded counsel available for a first custody
18. The Law Society may appoint lawyers to provide legal aid "on terms approved by the Minister [of
Justice]:" s.4.1, Legal Aid Act, supra note 16.
19. Access to Justice, supra note 15, 23.
20. The plan sets up both criminal and civil duty counsel panels. Under section 58 of the Legal Aid Act,
duty counsel are available in each judicial area (there are eight) and anyone charged with an offence,
wanting bail or prior to an appeal may seek their advice, even if they have not been issued a
certificate.
21. Subsection 12 (14) reads: "Where the Law Society is of the opinion that the Legal Aid Fund is in
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application, but not for subsequent applications. Since Ms G. was in fact the respon-
dent in an application for an extension of a custody order, she would not have been
eligible for state-funded counsel even under the new arrangements.
III. A STEPAT A TIME: NOT Too FAR AND NOT TOO FAST
A. There's Moot ... and There's Moot
Not only had Athey J. determined the custody application before she decided the
motion to appoint counsel, but also J.G. had been represented by a lawyer at the
custody hearing. In short, the issue was moot. As Lamer C.J. said, when the case
reached the Supreme Court, there was "no 'live controversy,"' "[t]he tangible and
concrete dispute has disappeared, and the issue has become academic. '22 Athey J.
decided the motion to appoint counsel because the parties had agreed it "would not be
considered moot."'23 By the time it reached the Court of Appeal in May 1996, Ms G.'s
children had been returned to her, but the Court exercised its discretion to hear the
appeal because of "the importance of the issue."
'24
The Supreme Court considered the mootness issue more fully. As Lamer CJ. explained,
a well-developed case on this issue was unlikely to come before them again, since it
is in the nature of the circumstances that a parent denied legal aid would be unable to
hire counsel to raise the Charter issue on appeal; given the slow pace of the legal
system, most cases would be moot before they could reach the highest level; and finally
the Court was dealing with a "real" issue and not an abstract issue (there were real
facts and there had been a real dispute).25 Furthermore, Lamer C.J. characterized the
case as being of national importance and said that it was desirable to provide guidelines
for the future. Because of the Court's willingness to hear a "moot" case,26 and
particularly because of its recognition of the implications of its decision for the future,
one had reason to expect a broader analysis of the nature of constitutional domestic
or civil legal aid obligations than the Court actually developed.
B. The Scope of Section 7: Painful Parsing
The interpretation given to section 7 by the Supreme Court advances both the
recognition of parental rights and availability of legal aid. Nevertheless, it reflects the
danger of being depleted, it may, with the approval of the Minister, issue directions to the Provincial
Director limiting the providing of legal aid in matters included in paragraphs (1)(c) to (g) and
subsection 2." This includes all matters other than criminal matters.
22. S.C.C. decision, supra note 1, at 142.
23. Trial decision, supra note 1, at 275.
24. Appeal decision, supra note 1, at 354.
25. S.C.C. decision, supra note 1, at 143-44.
26. The Chief Justice proceeded on the fiction that J.G. had not been represented in the custody proceed-
ings, even though she had been, and treated it as an allegation of a prospective breach: would the
failure of the Legal Aid Act or of the government through its legal aid program to provide counsel to
Ms G. have constituted a denial of her constitutional rights had she not been represented by counsel
at the custody hearing?
(2000) 15 Journal of Law and Social Policy
on-going conflict between a liberal and relatively strict interpretation of the section.
J.G. argued that section 7 includes the right of a parent to bring up her children and
that deprivation of her children without her having a fair opportunity to make her case
would be a breach of the principles of fundamental justice; in order to have a fair
opportunity to make her case, she needs legal representation and since she cannot
afford a lawyer, she requires state-funded counsel. The lower courts, relying in
different ways with different results on B.(R.) v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan
Toronto, address this issue as a liberty interest; at the Supreme Court, however, the
case was decided on the basis of the security interest.
Athey J., relying on La Forest J.'s comments in B.(R.), concludes that "[i]t is thus
arguable that when the state removes children from the care of their parents, the
parents' liberty interest is implicated. ' 27 Therefore, removal of a child from a parent
who does not have a lawyer at the protection proceedings might constitute a breach
of the principles of fundamental justice, but not necessarily, depending on the circum-
stances. 28 Ms G., she concluded, was capable of stating her case adequately: "[t]here
has been no suggestion that Ms G. lacks the capacity to understand the allegations
made by the Minister or that she is unable to communicate her position to the Court."
'29
The majority in the Court of Appeal took a cautious approach to section 7, preferring
to follow the opinion of Lamer C.J. because he "based his decision on the precise issue
of whether the integrity of the family was a liberty interest protected by s.7 of the
Charter." They concluded, therefore, "that his clear and unequivocal reasons should
be followed, at least until that Court rules to the contrary." As a result, they held that
the liberty interest does not encompass parental rights in child protection proceed-
ings.30
27. Trial decision, supra note 1, at 281. B.(R.) concerned whether a child could be given medical
treatment against the wishes of her parents, Jehovah's Witnesses. La Forest J. sjioke for himself and
three other judges in finding that parental rights were encompassed by the liberty interest, but that
there had been compliance with the principles of fundamental justice; three judges held that while
liberty might include the right of parents to make certain kinds of decisions for their children, it did
not encompass the right to withhold necessary medical treatment (that is, the right to endanger their
children); Lamer C.J. stated that the liberty interest did not encompass parental rights of any kind;
and Sopinka J. declined to address the liberty issue because he also concluded that the principles of
fundamental justice had been met: supra note 2.
28. Trial decision, ibid. at 282.
29. Ibid. at 283. Lamer C.J. stated that Athey J. had applied too low a standard by, in effect, applying the
test for determining competence to stand trial: S.C.C. decision, supra note 1, at 154.
30. They also referred to two other Supreme Court decisions in support of this position: one in which
L'Heureux-Dubd J., for a unanimous Court, held that a claim for damages for wrongful death is
effectively a claim that the Charter protects "the right to maintain and continue a parent-child
relationship" which does not fall within the liberty interest: August v. Gosset, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 268;
and the second in which La Forest J. stated, again for a unanimous Court, that section 7's liberty
interest arises only when there is a possibility of imprisonment: R. v. Richard, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 525.
Although they refer to this point, they do not make anything of the fact that L'Heureux-Dubd J. was
distinguishing this claim from "a right to make decisions concerning her son's education and health,"
not treating the two as synonymous. The issue in Richard was whether an automatic conviction for
failure to pay a traffic ticket attracted the liberty interest; the Court held it did not because the penalty
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Rather than emphasize that one judge, albeit the Chief Justice, denied a parental liberty
interest, as did the majority, Bastarache J.A. (as he then was 31), dissenting in the Court
of Appeal, emphasized that "[n]o clear majority exists on the question of the applica-
bility of s.7 to parental control" and proceeded to fill the vacuum. 32 While concluding
that it is unlikely that "liberty" in section 7 will be broadly interpreted, he observed
that the broadest interpretation it has been given has occurred in family law cases and
"in those cases, the 'liberty' interest in question is akin to that found in criminal law
cases." In these cases, children are detained by the state, a situation which "is as valid
an exception to the general application of s.7 to the criminal law as those ... cited by
Lamer, C.J. in B.(R.) ... referring to the civil processes for restraining mentally
disordered persons or isolating contagious persons.
'33
In essence, this is the approach taken by the Supreme Court of Canada, except that
Lamer C.J. finds the right in security of the person and not in the liberty component
of section 7. Because his analysis is premised on his consideration of section 7 in
B.(R.) and on an avoidance of the confusion in that decision, it is worth a short detour
to examine that case in order to obtain a better understanding of the thinking in G.(J.).
B.(R.) was not about legal aid, but about the right of parents to decide whether their
child should receive medical treatment considered necessary to the child's health and
even survival. Baby Sheena, born prematurely, received medical treatment with the
consent of her parents, Jehovah's Witnesses. When the attending doctors concluded
that Sheena required a blood transfusion, possibly to save her life, her parents objected
and the Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto obtained a 72-hour wardship,
subsequently extended for 21 days after the opportunity for a full hearing. Eventually
Sheena did have a blood transfusion.34 Although all the judges held that the interven-
* tion contravened neither freedom of religion nor section 7, they disagreed on where
the parental interest was located, if at all.
In B.(R.), the Chief Justice took a deferential approach: while agreeing that the Charter
must be given a large and liberal interpretation, he said that "[t]he flexibility of the
principles it expresses does not give us authority to distort their true meaning and
purpose, nor to manufacture a constitutional law that goes beyond the manifest
intention of its framers."
'35
was a fine and not imprisonment (they held that the process which included a notice on the ticket
complied with the principles of fundamental justice).
31. By the time the Supreme Court heard the appeal from the Court of Appeal's decision, Mr. Justice
Bastarache had been appointed to the highest court. He did not, of course, sit on G.(J.).
32. Appeal decision, supra note 1 at 368.
33. Ibid. at 365.
34. Sheena's parents did not actually object to the intervention in principle, but to the procedure by
which it occurred; they unsuccessfully proposed a process which they believed would conform to
Charter requirements.
35. B.(R.), supra note 2 at 337. In contrast, in Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, decided before B.(R.), the
Chief Justice interpreted section 7 to encompass substantive due process, despite the manifest inten-
tion of the framers as revealed in the Proceedings of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and
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It is important to appreciate that conclusions about the meaning of life, liberty and
security of the person are a consequence of how section 7 is read as a whole. Lamer
C.J. describes the relationship between the first and second part of the section thusly:
... [O]n the one hand, s.7 means that the protection afforded to [life, liberty and
security of the person] is not absolute; the state may limit them as long as it does so
in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. On the other hand, the
connection drawn between the principles of fundamental justice and the protected
rights must be an indication of the nature and scope of the rights protected. The
liberty in question must therefore be one that may be limited through the operation
of some mechanism that involves and actively engages the principles of fundamen-
tal justice. Principles of fundamental justice pertain to the justice system. They are
designed to govern both the means by which one may be brought before the judicial
system and the conduct of judges and other actors once the individual is brought
within it. Apart from a situation in which the state engages the judicial system, it is
difficult to think of an application for the principles of fundamental justice.36
It is this approach which leads Sopinka J. in B.(R.) to refer to whether a deprivation
is in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice as "the threshold require-
ment."37
In short, Lamer C.J. limits the interests protected by section 7 by the qualifying clause,
rather than identifying the interest and then ensuring that any deprivation is consistent
with the principles of fundamental justice which have also been separately defined.
Thus "the type of liberty s.7 refers to must be the liberty that may taken away or limited
by a court or by another agency on which the state confers a coercive power to enforce
its laws." More narrowly, indeed, "the subject matter of s.7 must be the conduct of the
state when the state calls on law enforcement officials to enforce and secure obedience
to the law, or invokes the law to deprive a person of liberty through judges, magistrates,
ministers, board members, etc." Liberty, then, contains a "physical dimension" and
does not protect "even fundamental freedoms if those freedoms have no connection
with the physical dimension of the concept of 'liberty."' 38 On this view, most com-
monly liberty can be asserted by an individual who is potentially subject to imprison-
ment under the criminal justice regime, but it may also include restraint of a mentally
disordered person or isolation of a contagious person under civil processes. The rights
of the House of Commons on the Constitution to limit it to procedural due process: [1985] 2 S.C.R.
486, at 513; similarly, in the Provincial Judges Reference, decided after B.(R.), he extended the
foundational principle of judicial independence to civil provincial courts in the face of minimal
historical and written authority, thus earning a sharp rebuke from La Forest J: [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3, at
172-175.
36. B.(R.), ibid. at 339. The determination of the content of "the principles of fundamental justice" is one
properly belonging to the judiciary, for "[fi]t is the judges who invented and developed the concept of
'fundamental justice."
37. Ibid. at 428. La Forest J., on the other hand, says that the meaning of the section 7 interests might
affect the content of the principles of fundamental justice: ibid. at 363.
38. Ibid. at 341. He refers to the connection between section 7 and sections 8 to 14 and the common
heading "Legal Rights" in support of this position.
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guaranteed by section 7, connected to each other, refer to the individual "as a corporeal
entity, as opposed to the person's spirit, aspirations, conscience, beliefs, personality
or, more generally, the expression or realization of what makes up the person's
non-corporeal identity. ' 39 Liberty as it refers to a person's non-corporeal identity is
protected by section 2,40 where it refers to "the ability of every individual to choose,
act or 'be' as he or she sees fit, free of any constraints. '4 1 It might be observed,
however, that despite this approach to liberty, in G.(J.) the Chief Justice acknowledges,
somewhat reluctantly, that violations of fundamental freedoms under section 2 can
result in a violation of security of the person.
42
Lamer C.J. thus concluded in B.(R.) that, while "parental liberty" might be important
as part of "the more general concept of the autonomy or integrity of the family unit,
"the liberty interest protected by s.7 ... includes neither the right of parents to choose
(or refuse) medical treatment for their children nor, more generally, the right to bring
up or educate their children without undue interference by the state." 43 He rejected
the broad meaning given to "liberty" which had been advanced by Wilson J. in R. v.
Jones and R. v. Morgentaler in which she relied both on the American jurisprudence
and on general comments by Dickson C.J. about the importance of individual auton-
omy and conscience.44 Finding the American jurisprudence of limited applicability in
the Canadian context, Lamer C.J. maintained that one could not transfer Dickson C.J.'s
comments, which were about interpreting the Charter as a whole, without consider-
ation for context; he pointed out that in both Jones and Morgentaler "the factual
context ... was one in which the state was interfering in individual and personal
choices in order to turn particular behaviour into a criminal offence.
45
39. Ibid. at 346-47.
40. Lamer C.J. states, in fact, that he would have been "much more receptive" to the parents' arguments
(and his colleagues' reasons) had they relied on freedom of conscience for protection of parental
rights: ibid. at 350.
41. Ibid at 342; also see 336.
42. S.C.C. decision, supra note 1 at 147.
43. B.(R.), supra note 2 at 330.
44. Ibid at 332-335. Jones refused to send his children to school, educating them and other children in a
church basement without obtaining an exemption under the Alberta School Act. He was charged with
truancy with carried a potential penalty of imprisonment. The majority of the Supreme Court held
that, assuming that liberty included the right of parents to decide how to educate their children, the
relevant provisions were consistent with the principles of fundamental justice; only Wilson J. actu-
ally decided that liberty did include that right: R. v. Jones, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284. Morgentaler was
charged with performing an abortion contrary to section 251 of the Criminal Code and argued, in his
defence, that section 251 contravened women's rights under section 7 of the Charter. R. v. Morgentaler,
[1988] 1 S.C.R. 30. The majority of the Supreme Court struck down section 251 on the basis that it
contravened the security of the person and was not in accordance with the principles of fundamental
justice. Only Wilson J. held that section 251 also contravened the liberty interest which included the
right of individuals to make important decisions affecting their lives free from intervention by the
state.
45. B.(R.), ibid. at 335.
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In B.(R.), La Forest J. wrote for himself and Gonthier and McLachlin JJ. (as she then
was); L'Heureux-Dub J. concurred with these reasons. 46 While liberty is not absolute
(it does not mean "unconstrained freedom"), he said, it is not limited to physical
movement or addresses only the right to be free from physical restraint: "the individual
must be left room for personal autonomy to live his or her own life and to make
decisions that are of fundamental personal importance. ' 47 In La Forest J.'s view, it is
"plain" that "the right to nurture a child, to care for its development, and to make
decisions for it in fundamental matters such as medical care, are part of the liberty
interest of a parent," since "[t]he common law has long recognized that parents are in
the best position to take care of their children and make all the decisions necessary to
ensure their well-being." 48 Recognition of parental rights derives both from the belief
that they are more likely to know what is in their children's best interests and from the
fact that the state "is ill-equipped to make such decisions itself." Even so, there are
socially acceptable standards which parents must meet and when they do not, the state
may intervene, subject to monitoring by the courts and conformity "to the values
underlying the Charter," including the requirements of fair procedure. 49 State inter-
vention, permitted by the principles of fundamental justice, limits the rights of the
parents; it is not to vindicate the constitutional rights of children. L'Heureux-Dub6 J.
applies these comments in G.(J.).50
Iacobucci and Major JJ., who wrote joint reasons for themselves and Cory J., took a
much different approach. 5 1 They treated child protection as a constitutional right of
the child to life and security and not merely a limit on parental rights, at least in the
context of necessary medical treatment.52 They concluded that "an exercise of parental
liberty which seriously endangers the survival of the child [falls] outside s.7.
''53
Parents should not be allowed to endanger their child subject only to whether there
has been compliance with procedural requirements.
54
46. L'Heureux-Dub6 J. wrote separate reasons because she dissented on the cross-appeal which
involved the question of whether the District Court judge had erred in awarding costs against the
Attorney General of Ontario who had intervened in the case to support the legislative provisions.
47. B.(R.), supra note 2 at 368.
48. Ibid. at 370.
49. Ibid at 373.
50. S.C.C. decision, supra note 1 at 166.
51. The remaining judge, Sopinka J., agreed with La Forest J., except that he did not consider it necessary to
determine whether there was an infringement of the liberty interest since "the threshold requirement of a
breach of the principles of fundamental justice was not met:" B.(R.), supra note 2 at 428.
52. Ibid. at 430. The provision at issue was section 19(l)(b)(ix), Child Welfare Act, R.S.O. 1980, c.66
(repealed by the time of the hearing) which defined "a child in need of protection" in part as "a child
where the person in whose charge the child is neglects or refuses to provide or obtain proper medical,
surgical or other recognized remedial care or treatment necessary for the child's health or well-being,
or refuses to permit such care or treatment to be supplied to the child when it is recommended by a
legally qualified medical practitioner, or otherwise fails to protect the child adequately."
53. Ibid. at 431-32.
54. lacobucci and Major JJ. explain that the conflicting interests are not between an individual and the
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After B.(R.), therefore, there is a "stand-off' between whether parental rights (or some
exercise of them) fall within the liberty interest or not. Apart from a passing reference
by Iacobucci and Major JJ., security was not considered as a home for parental rights.
Thus security of the person provided a vehicle for a "fresh start" on the question,
particularly since all Ms G. was asking was to be able to give her side of the story in
an effective way.
Security of the person, the Supreme Court of Canada has said, encompasses "personal
autonomy, at least with respect to the right to make choices concerning one's own
body, control over one's physical and psychological integrity, and basic human dignity
... at least to the extent of freedom from criminal prohibitions which interfere with
these."'55 Lamer C.J. says in G.(B.), "[flor a restriction of security of the person to be
made out ... the impugned state action must have a serious and profound effect on a
person's psychological integrity."' 56 The effects "need not rise to the level of nervous
shock or psychiatric illness, but must be greater than ordinary stress or anxiety." The
removal of a child from his or her parent's care can have a profound psychological
impact on both the parent and the child. 57 The parent-child cases are thus akin to other
interests such as a claim to assisted suicide or civil committal to a mental institution. 58
In all these cases the individual's interaction with the justice system has the potential
to undermine her or his psychological integrity.
The Chief Justice identifies a number of ways in which a parent may experience stress
when the state takes her child into care: "the loss of companionship of the child," the
"gross intrusion into a private and intimate sphere" through the inspection and review
in which the state engages and the stigmatization resulting from state intervention.
Indeed, "[a]s an individual's status as a parent is often fundamental to personal
identity, the stigma and distress resulting from a loss of parental status is a particularly
serious consequence of the state's conduct. ' 59 The parent in child custody cases is
state, but between Sheena's right to life and security of the person and her parents' freedom of
religion. They limit the scope of freedom of religion in the same way. It is interesting that these
judges are prepared to pit rights against each other at this stage of the analysis, when they will not do
so in cases involving, for example, equality and freedom of expression. In Keegstra, for example,
equality was an element in the section 1 analysis, but was not treated as a countervailing right at the
initial stage: [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697. The difference, it appears, is that the Court's parens patriae
jurisdiction comes into play in B.(R.). Major and Cory JJ. both sat on G.(J.), but neither took this
approach of beginning with the child's right and asking if the parent's right contravened it, probably
because of the nature of Ms G's claim which perhaps more clearly than the claim in B.(R) did not
attack the child protection proceedings themselves.
55. Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 519, at 588, per Sopinka J.,
speaking for himself and four other judges; McLachlin and L'Heureux-Dub6 JJ., dissenting, agreed
with this aspect of Sopinka J.'s analysis. Lamer C.J. decided the case on the basis of section 15 of the
Charter and did not consider the scope of section 7 at all. Also see R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1
S.C.R. 30 and Reference re ss.193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123.
56. S.C.C. decision, supra note 1 at 147.
57. S.C.C. decision, supra note 1 at 152.
58. Ibid. at 149.
59. Ibid. at 148.
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being judged "unfit."' 60 The proceedings themselves are a source of stress, since they
are "effectively adversarial" and require the parent to make her case in a legal manner
in what may be "a foreign environment, and under significant emotional strain."'61 The
kind of stress experienced by a parent in these circumstances is similar to that felt by
an accused whose trial has been unduly delayed. 62 Thus where the state initiates child
protection proceedings, the parents' section 7 security rights are invoked.
The question to be considered, therefore, is whether the lack of legal representation
at the custody hearing is in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice: are
child custody proceedings in which the parent is not represented by legal counsel
fair?63 For the hearing to be fair, "the parent must have an opportunity to present his
or her case effectively" in order to ensure that necessary information about the child's
home life which is relevant to determining the best interests of the child is before the
judge. Whether legal counsel is necessary to allow the parent to present her case will
depend on the circumstances of the case and the parent. Thus the Chief Justice
emphasizes that "[iun the circumstances of this case, the appellant's right to a fair
hearing required that she be represented by counsel." 64 Accordingly, there is an
infringement of section 7 which the Court holds is not justified under section 1.65
Where the conditions are satisfied, therefore, the trial judge should order that the
government provide the parent with state-funded legal counsel.
C. Entitlement to Counsel: Following the Criminal Model
The Court's experience with the circumstances under which counsel should be funded
by the state has been in the criminal sphere and that is where Lamer C.J. finds the
remedy for Ms G. In addition, the Court is concerned to ensure that the right to counsel
of parents in these cases is not more than the rights of accused. The Court has
consistently held that the Charter does not guarantee an absolute right to state-funded
legal counsel in the criminal context; this decision is consistent with that position.
Neither section 10 (guaranteeing a right to counsel) nor section 7 of the Charter
includes an absolute right to state-funded legal counsel, but "a limited right to
60. This distinguishes the custody cases from at least some other cases in which there is state involve-
ment in the parent-child relationship, such as when a child is sentenced to jail, conscripted into the
army or shot by a police officer. These actions do not "usurp[] the parental role" or "pry[] into the
intimacies of the relationship." A police officer shot Ms August's son in August v. Gosset, supra
note 30.
61. S.C.C. decision, supra note 1 at 152-53.
62. Mills v. The Queen, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863, at 919-20.
63. There was no dispute in this case that there are ircumstances when the best interests of child, their
health and safety, may warrant their removal from their parents by the state.
64. S.C.C. decision, supra note 1 at 151 [emphasis in original].
65. The government's justification, the saving of money, is insufficient to satisfy section 1 since the
Chief Justice considers the savings to be minimal and outweighed by the parent's right to a fair
hearing. As the Chief Justice points out, section 1 of the Charter will save infringements of section 7
only in unusual ("exceptional") cases, not only because the interests at stake are "very significant"
and unlikely to be outweighed by competing social interests, but also because a violation of the
principles of fundamental justice will rarely be considered a reasonable limit: ibid. at 159.
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state-funded counsel arises under s. 7 to ensure a fair hearing in the circumstances"
outlined by the Chief Justice in this case.66 These factors - the seriousness of the
issue, complexity of the case and the capacity of the individual to participate mean-
ingfully in the hearing - are similar to those identified by the lower courts in finding
a limited right to state-funded counsel in criminal cases.
67
This constitutional entitlement to state-funded counsel does not require the govern-
ment to establish a new plan, for it may only be in "rare" cases that counsel will have
to be funded. To direct the government to change the plan would be inappropriately
intrusive. Rather, it will be the responsibility of the trial judge, as in the criminal
cases, 68 to decide whether the parent or parents need legal representation for a fair
hearing of the state's application to remove their children, subject to the guidelines
set down by the Chief Justice.
Judges are to consider "the seriousness of the interests at stake, the complexity of the
proceedings, and the capacities of the appellant."'69 In this case, the Minister was
seeking to extend the original six month order and thus the already extensive separa-
tion of mother and children (the Chief Justice recognizes here that the longer the
separation, the less likely the parent will regain custody), the complexity of the hearing
(with 15 affidavits, including two expert reports) and the fact that the father of one of
the children was represented by counsel, the children had counsel and of course the
state had counsel. J.G. was not equipped to respond to the demands of these circum-
stances: "[i]n proceedings as serious and complex as these, an unrepresented parent
will ordinarily need to possess superior, intelligence or education, communication
skills, composure, and familiarity with the legal system in order to effectively present
his or her case," characteristics J.G. did not possess. 70 Nor is it sufficient that the parent
can understand the allegations or communicate her position to the court. This was the
standard applied by the trial judge and it was explicitly rejected by the Chief Justice
in favour of a standard which requires that "the parent must be able to participate
meaningfully at the hearing."'71 Ordinarily, deference would be shown to a judge's
conclusion about whether a parent needed counsel for a fair hearing because the judge
is better able to assess the complexity of the proceedings and the capacity of the parent;
furthermore, "[e]ven if the parent is in need of some assistance, the judge may feel
66. Ibid. at 162.
67. The criteria relate to the proceedings (length and complexity) and the accused (education and ability
to conduct his or her own defence). See, for example, R. v. Rowbotham (1988), 41 C.C.C. (3d) I
(Ont. C.A.) and R. v. Rain (1998), 130 C.C.C. (3d) 167 (Alta. C.A.) (Appeal to S.C.C. dismissed
April 1, 1999): [1998] S.C.C.A. No. 609, online: Q.L. (SCCA).
68. There is a difference between child protection and criminal cases, of course, in that a stay of
proceedings or exclusion of evidence is possible in criminal cases where the individual does not have
a lawyer, the first to give the accused a chance to retain counsel and the second to deal with the
consequences following a lack of legal advice.
69. S.C.C. decision, supra note 1 at 151-52.
70. Ibid. at 153.
71. Ibid. at 154.
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that he or she can intervene sufficiently to ensure the fairness of the hearing. '72 The
circumstances of this case being "unusual," however, the Chief Justice is prepared not
to give deference to the trial judge's determination.
73
Lamer C.J. set out the process to be followed when a parent seeks state-funded counsel.
The judge must ask the parent whether she or he has applied for legal aid or other
assistance and where the parent has not done so, must adjourn the proceedings, where
the best interests of the children are not put at risk, to permit the parent to make
application for legal aid. Then the judge should consider whether the parent can
receive a fair hearing, taking into account "the seriousness of the interests at stake,
the complexities of the proceedings, and the capacities of the parent," as well as his
or her "ability to assist the parent within the limits of the judicial role." If the judge
"is not satisfied" that the parent cannot receive a fair hearing and there is no other way
to provide counsel, "the judge should order the government to provide the parent with
state- funded counsel under s. 24(1) of the Charter."'74 The government can then decide
how it wants to provide counsel; it does not have to be through the legal aid plan.
75
IV. BETTER HALF A LOAF ... ?
In the immediate, the benefit of G.(J.) will lie in how judges exercise their judgement
in ordering state-funded counsel in child protection cases. Lamer C.J. and L' Heureux-
Dub6 J. view the anticipated impact of the G.(J.) decision differently. Lamer C.J.
suggests that the case in which a judge will order state-funded counsel may be "rare,"
while L'Heureux-Dub6 J. believes that "the right to funded counsel in child protection
hearings, when a parent cannot afford a lawyer and the parent is not covered by the
legal aid scheme, will not infrequently be invoked. ' 76 She pointedly asserts that "trial
judges should not, in my view, consider the issue from the starting point that counsel
will be necessary to ensure a fair hearing only in rare cases."'77 One reason for their
different expectations, despite the subject matter of this case, is the Chief Justice's
view that "permanent guardianship applications are more serious than temporary
custody applications" and "[tiherefore counsel will more likely be necessary in
guardianship applications than custody applications. ' 78 L'Heureux-Dub6 J., in con-
72. Ibid.
73. First, the Chief Justice points out that the trial judge did not have the benefit of "these reasons" (and
therefore applied too low a standard, akin to that applied to whether an accused is competent to stand
trial); second, she decided the issue after the hearing and may have been unduly influenced by the
participation of counsel since the proceedings may have gone more smoothly than they would have
had J.G. not had counsel, thus masking the complexity of the hearing and any limitations J.G. might
have had in representing herself: ibid. at 154.
74. Ibid. at 160-61.
75. Ibid. at 156.
76. Ibid. at 102, 167.
77. Ibid. at 169.
78. Ibid. at 155. He finds support for this view in the fact that the New Brunswick plan made this
distinction.
En Route to More Equitable Access to the Legal System
trast, recognizes that "temporary applications are often part of a process that leads to
permanent ones, and it is necessary to consider the seriousness of the proceeding in
relation to both the short-term and long-term interests of the parents affected. '79 The
Chief Justice's comments in this instance are not conducive to the proper standard
being applied by trial judges in future cases. If G.(J.) is to have any real effect, trial
judges and reviewing courts must understand that temporary orders are in many ways
as significant as permanent orders: they may set a new "base line" for the assumptions
about the parent's capacity to act appropriately towards their children; they can have
the kind of demoralizing impact on a parent which results in a self-fulfilling prophecy
with respect to the parent's conduct; and they further increase the alienation from the
legal-system and "the authorities" which a parent who, as all judges acknowledge, may
be among those persons with the least understanding of or the most unhappy contacts
with the legal system, already feels.
The case does not provide a great deal of guidance for trial judges, despite its reliance
on the indicia in criminal cases, and it will be important to remember the vulnerability
of parents who have been "accused," as it may seem to them, of being unfit. Both
Lamer C.J. and L'Heureux-Dub J. observe that child protection proceedings are more
often brought against persons who are the most disadvantaged, financially and in other
ways. 80 L'Heureux-Dub6 J. cautions that in determining whether a parent is able to
represent herself, "the focus should be on the parent's education level, linguistic
abilities, facility in communicating, age, and similar indicators," factors which "will
[not] have considerable effects on the determination of the ultimate result of the
Minister's application."' s It will be necessary that parents unable to afford counsel be
aware of the relevant criteria; women's help groups can help to transmit this informa-
tion to their clients, for example; another source is public legal education services.
The second step in the G.(J.) type cases will be to challenge to a judge's refusal to
order state-funded legal aid on the basis of an inappropriate consideration of the
criteria, recognizing that the appellate courts are likely to grant some deference to the
trial judge's determination of this matter. Monitoring of "J.G. orders" will be necessary
to ensure that the entitlement guaranteed by G.(J.) is realized.
While G.(J.) itself is about state-funded counsel, governments are left to decide how
they will provide this service. Coupled with the apparently acceptable "legal services"
standard in Winters,82 released a few days after G.(J.), it might be tempting for
governments to widen the availability of their plans (this will depend on the plan, few
being as limited as New Brunswick's), while providing something less than counsel
representation at the hearing. Winters was a penitentiary inmate who faced the
possibility of up to 30 days in solitary confinement as the outcome of a disciplinary
hearing for assault in the prison. Cory J., speaking for himself alone, maintained that
79. Ibid. at 155 and 168, respectively.
80. Ibid. at 156 and 165, respectively.
81. Ibid. at 169.
82. Winters, supra note 6.
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Winters was entitled to a publicly-funded lawyer, while Binnie J., writing for the
majority of the Court, was of the view that something less than that might satisfy the
requirements of the legislation. The Legal Services Society Act stated only that the
Legal Services Society would provide in the specified cases, "services ordinarily
provided by a lawyer," which did not necessarily mean legal representation. 83
This approach, open to the Court in Winters because of the wording of the relevant
statute, reflects the approach taken in Rowbotham, the case usually considered to be
the defining case with respect to the entitlement to state-funded counsel by criminal
accused. In Rowbotham, the Court held that the accused seeking state-funded counsel
(not Rowbotham, in fact, but a woman named Laura Kononow) did not require legal
counsel at all times during the trial. The case involved multiple defendants and many
days of hearing; the evidence against Kononow was a relatively small part of it and
therefore the Court stated that while she was entitled to state-funded counsel, it would
be only for the portions of the trial she really needed counsel to attend, similar to the
common practice in complex trials with privately-funded counsel. 84 Governments,
and not only judges, therefore will have to be monitored in order to ensure that the
kind of services they provide are consistent with the intent of G.(J.).
Somewhat more broadly, G.(J.) constitutionalizes a qualified entitlement to legal aid
in analogous cases beyond the criminal sphere, an important advance. Despite the
focus on child protection proceedings, rather than a broader consideration of civil legal
aid, it should be possible to apply the same principles to other civil contexts, even if
on a case by case basis. Legal aid across the country varies in coverage; it is the
principles established in G.(J.) that give it the national importance to which Lamer
C.J. referred, not the specific coverage of child protection proceedings. This possibil-
ity is reinforced by Winters, even though it did not raise a constitutional argument, but
was concerned "merely" with whether the wording of the Legal Services Society Act
mandated the provision of legal assistance in his case.85 The Legal Services Society
had argued that disciplinary proceedings were "internal" and not civil (and that solitary
confinement was not "confinement" since Winters had already lost his liberty). The
Society's argument that disciplinary hearings were not civil proceedings was rejected
by both Cory J., for himself, and Binnie J., who wrote the majority reasons and they
also agreed that given the psychological impact of solitary confinement, the inmate
was entitled to legal services to ensure a fair hearing.
Although in a sense it can be read as holding the government to its own standards,
Winters can also be said to stand with G.(J.) in restricting the scope of government to
define entitlement to state-funded counsel.86 Given the analysis, in fact, which uses
83. Ibid. at 103. Binnie J. did say that in cases where solitary confinement was a "plausible risk," legal
counsel was probably required: ibid. at 107.
84. Rowbotham, supra note 66, at 68.
85. The Act stated that services would be provided "a qualifying individual who ... may be imprisoned
or confined through civil proceedings:" Legal Services Society Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c.227, s.3(2)(b).
86. Binnie J. does say that if the government does not want to provide services to inmates facing
disciplinary proceedings, it can amend the legislation to say so: Winters, supra note 6, at 104. But
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language similar to that used in G.(J.), this is probably the kind of proceeding which
would benefit from the holding in G.(J.). Although Lamer C.J. says that he is
concerned only with child protection proceedings, inevitably the case will be used to
extend the availability of legal aid to other civil cases in which a security interest, or
any section 7 interest, is at stake. It will require some nudging, however, to progress
from the cases in which there is state intervention to those in which the state's failure
to provide a means to enforce rights sustains a claim to legal representation. Most
likely, it will be necessary to establish a broader interpretation of liberty, aswell as a
greater appreciation of the systemic nature of law.
With G.(J.), the debate about the parental-child relationship has shifted from the
liberty interest to the security interest under section 7. The issue, therefore, is not
whether there is some "right" of autonomous decision-making in parents in relation
to their children, but whether the removal of children from their parents by the state
undermines the parents' and children's psychological integrity. 87 This parsing of
section 7 is difficult for litigants, since the reality is that many interests may be said
to affect both liberty and security, given the way in which security has been defined.
It may be, however, that the insistence in "slotting" an interest into the pigeon-holes
of life, liberty and security is less important than how the judges view the relationship
between the two parts of the section, since this influences how the interests will be
read.
Lamer C.J.'s early comments on section 7 dismissed the concerns which had been
expressed that "all but a narrow construction of s. 7 will inexorably lead the courts to
'question the wisdom of enactments,' to adjudicate upon the merits of public policy."' 88
Perhaps it is the Chief Justice's own background in criminal law which led him to
emphasize the second part of section 7, rather than the first; regardless, from the
beginning he has stressed that "principles of fundamental justice" must be given a
broad interpretation (to include substantive content), but has resiled from a generous
and liberal interpretation of the first part of section 7. No doubt this is meant to balance
the impact of section 7; Lamer C.J. has expressed a fear that the result of too generous
an interpretation of section 7 (particularly of the liberty interest) would mean that it
protected "all eccentricities expressed by members of our society," among which
judges would have to choose those which are "fundamental;" he felt that "this
approach would inevitably lead to a situation where we would have government by
judges" which "must not become the case."' 89 "Principles of fundamental justice" has
thus served as the dam against an overwhelming flood of interests that the Chief Justice
feared might otherwise be held to come within section 7.
presumably the first thing such an inmate in Winters' position (facing solitary confinement) would
do would be to cite G.(J.) for the proposition that he or she was entitled to legal services (or even
legal counsel) because of the psychological stress resulting from the penalty of solitary confinement.
87. S.C.C. decision, supra note 1 at 152.
88. Reference re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act (B.C.), supra note 34 at 497.
89. B.(R.), supra note 2 at 348, see also supra note 35.
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The Court's reluctance to require government to take positive action to protect
interests, rather than merely refrain from acting in a manner intrusive of protected
interests has been another reason for the restrained interpretation of the first part of
section 7. Yet it has been willing to break with this principle at times, including in the
legal aid cases themselves, to ensure conformity with principles of fundamental
justice. They have done so in cases involving section 15, as well, for example in
Eldridge9o and Vriend.91 In these cases, the Court has not merely prohibited govern-
ments from acting unconstitutionally, they have required them to take action. Thus
requiring government to act is within the permissible range of remedies. 92
V. IT'S TIME FOR A NEW APPROACH TO SECTION 7
I suggest that it is time to reconsider the approach to section 7 applied in G.(J.) and
to develop one which acknowledges the contextual and substantive nature of "princi-
ples of fundamental justice." This approach would start with the meaning given to the
interests protected by section 7 and view the principles of fundamental justice clause
as an internal qualifier of their exercise. The initial focus should be on the interests
which require interpretation as a freestanding exercise; their meaning should be
filtered through section 15 in order to ensure that the interests are reflective of all
communities in Canada. It is only after the rights have been established that the issue
of qualification arise. There are two limits on section 7 rights: the first is internal
(individuals have a right to liberty, but can be deprived of it as long as the government
can show that the deprivation is consistent with the principles of fundamental justice)
and the second is external, section 1 of the Charter (any deprivation on liberty which
is in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice must be justified as a
reasonable limit in a democratic society). This is not to say that the inherent or internal
limit is not part of the definition of the right; the right is not liberty, but not to be
deprived of liberty except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice
(just as the right under section 8 is not the right to be free from seizure, but from
unreasonable seizure).
How would this apply in the case of legal aid? In G.(J.), legal aid is important as a
means of meeting the requirements of fundamental justice: the principles of funda-
mental justice require that persons subject to court proceedings (in certain instances
of state intervention, at least) have the opportunity to make their own case before the
body adjudicating on their situation. Accused have the right to a lawyer to defend
themselves, those who face involuntary committal to mental facilities have a right to
a lawyer to explain why they should not be committed, parents faced with removal of
their children in child protection proceedings are entitled to a lawyer to tell the judge
90. Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624.
91. Vriendv. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493.
92. Bastarache J.A. makes this point, saying that the Charter "must also mandate its function in those
limited cases where individuals can make legitimate claims against it in the name of liberty and
human dignity" in order to realize the full meaning of the phrase "fundamental justice" in section 7:
Appeal decision, supra note 1 at 366.
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why they should not lose custody of their children and why the best interests of their
children require that they remain with them, their parents - as long as they cannot pay
for a lawyer themselves, their case is sufficiently complex, the consequences are suffi-
ciently serious and they are sufficiently incapable of making their case themselves.
But it is also possible to see access to the legal system as an interest in itself if we
understand that access to the legal system is the way in which the rights we have -
and by which we are in large measure defined - are realized. The scope of the section
7 rights is amenable to extension in a manner consistent with significant Canadian
values and organizing principles, an argument made in relation to social and economic
rights.93 Access to the legal system, in a country governed by the rule of law
theoretically and by a panoply of laws in fact, ought to have recognition as an
independent interest.
We define rights in part by enforceability: where there is a right, there is a remedy -
and there must also be a means to acquire that remedy. Citizenship, I suggest, is
measured in significant part by our capacity to obtain remedies for harms done to us,
to guard against overzealous government intervention and to vindicate our definition
of self. Where, for example, an individual requires access to the legal system to realize
the rights the law has given to her, lack of meaningful access is a contravention of the
promise inherent in the rights. The promise is not of a particular outcome, but of the
possibility of the outcome. We are, in a sense, not merely flesh and blood and
possessors of emotions and cognitive functions, but also a bundle of legal "rights" or
interests to be asserted as necessary to maintain or enhance our participation in a
society of other legally identified beings and to be reconciled with assertions of their
interests by others. I do not say that this a good thing necessarily - to be defined in
part as a bundle of rights - but it is an important thing. It is particularly significant
when we realize not only that individuals who cannot afford legal services are also
often highly reliant on the governmental provision of goods and services, but that
many areas of life are administered through government and other bureaucracies.
In this light, access to the legal system is properly characterized as a systemic matter
and not merely one which may be a problem for individuals. As with any right or
interest, some individuals will need to claim it more than others, but it is, I would
suggest fundamental to our existence as citizens (in the broad sense of the term). Once
lack of access is seen as a systemic "problem," it is more likely that it will be
understood that it requires a systemic solution. This does not automatically mean a
particular form of legal aid, but legal access programs which deliver a variety of
services as appropriate.
A broader recognition of access to the legal system as a constitutionalized right will,
of course, mean a significant extension of state-funded services. But it remains within
93. This argument has been made to support the applicability of sections 7 and 15 of the Charter in
Canada's realization of the obligations incurred under international covenants: M. Jackman, "From
National Standards to Justiciable Rights: Enforcing International Social and Economic Guarantees
through Charter of Rights Review," (1999) 14 J.L & Soc. Pol'y. 69.
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the Court's jurisdiction to ensure that more equitable access to the legal system does
not necessarily mean an entirely tax-funded legal aid system. On the other hand, it has
been suggested that the risk of cases such as G.(J.) which constitutionalize entitlement
to state-funded counsel on a separate rights basis is that only constitutionalized
entitlements will be funded.94 A piecemeal diminution of legal services on this basis
is incompatible with a recognition of access itself as the section 7 interest, although
it may be that the obligation to provide access to the legal system can be best attained
through creative and comprehensive services, not necessarily through traditional
understandings of representation.
Whatever the merits of the comprehensive approach, the approach in G.(J.) itself will
require those who cannot afford legal representation to vindicate their rights to engage
the legal system just to establish that they have a right to engage the legal system with
the necessary tools, someone familiar with its workings. As Lamer C.J. said, under
the circumstances, these are the cases that will rarely get to court. Ms G. was able to
vindicate her rights because her lawyer was prepared to workpro bono. It is unfortun-
ate that the Court was rather parsimonious with respect to the kinds of interests that
would attract the protection of section 7 and, in turn, would be deemed appropriate
for legal aid. There is no doubt that the Court was cognizant that its decision does
require government to expend more funds on legal aid (assuming that governments
do not take the approach of robbing Peter to pay Paul); it has attempted to minimize
that burden. The result, however, is that the burden continues to be on those least able
to bear it, those subject to the kinds of proceedings the Court has held attract section
7 protection.
There are many kinds of benefits and proceedings related to the provision and denial
of those benefits which attract the question: can this landscape be adequately traversed
by someone lacking knowledge of the substantive provisions which grant entitlement
and unskilled in navigating the procedural requirements. I suggest that it is part of the
substantive enjoyment of rights that one be able to access them. In order to vindicate
the section 7 interests as they arise in the myriad of benefit systems which character-
izes the modern state, it is often necessary to engage the legal system. The fact that
these benefits are often directed at persons who are most vulnerable and marginalized,
merely confirms the need for someone to mediate the system. While not all aspects or
steps in the system will require legal assistance, when the legal system itself is the
forum, the individual often requires legal assistance to make a case for receipt of a
benefit, to challenge denial of one or to defend her or himself against loss of benefits
already gained. In this sense, the capacity to "make real" the paper entitlement is an
integral part of the entitlement to the benefit. 95
94. This point was made by Aneurin Thomas at the Osgoode Seminar on Legal Aid. It is an important
one and deserves a great deal more consideration than I can give it here. I merely mention it in
connection with my argument about a more comprehensive constitutionalization of access to the
legal system.
95. Cf. the Supreme Court's conclusion in Eldridge that sign language interpretation is an integral part of
En Route to More Equitable Access to the Legal System
Consider the myriad of administrative regimes which govern benefits which are either
directed at the more disadvantaged members of Canadian society or which more
disadvantaged members are more likely to invoke. Some of these involve detailed
rules governing eligibility and cut-off, along with extensive procedural arrangements:
employment insurance is an example. The claimants in other regimes are by definition
likely to be unfamiliar not only with the specific regime, but also with the underlying
cultural assumptions; this will be the case with immigration proceedings. Women who
enter Canada as dependents of their husbands may find themselves particularly
disadvantaged in vindicating their position if they need to leave an abusive situation.
Domestic workers whose sponsoring employer treats them badly or no longer wishes
to employ them may well have low education levels and English or French language
skills inadequate for dealing with the legal system. Social assistance claimants as a
group may well share the characteristics of Ms G. which led the Court to conclude she
could not adequately represent herself, as might the single mother refused subsidized
housing. Some claimants, such as those whose claim to social assistance is based on
a disability, may be faced with complex medical evidence to which they must respond.
All these examples in some way invoke section 7's security interest: all of them have
the potential to threaten the claimant's autonomy and psychological integrity when
the state invokes the judicial or administrative system to cut off benefits. The princi-
ples articulated in-G.(J.) are directly applicable to these cases. I would argue that the
state's involvement in determining claims is equally important. In all these cases, the
modern state establishes either specialized regimes for the distribution of benefits
which we have defined as necessary to an adequate existence, that is, aspects of our
existence which go to the heart of section 7's security interest: for example, housing or
financial support for those not in a position to earn an income from work, either
permanently or temporarily. For claimants to engage on an equal footing with these
specialized regimes, to understand how decisions are made and the patterns of the giving
and taking away of benefits, some kind of legal representation may often be necessary.
Similarly, the modern state has delegated to the private sector the opportunity to
benefit from the provision of services to particularly vulnerable citizens; thus tenants
of boarding houses are often "vulnerable adults," those who are poor or "frail," those
with physical or psychological disabilities, those who are "developmentally delayed"
or have Alzheimer's disease and the elderly.96 In these cases, consistency with the
principles of fundamental justice, one can argue, requires that the vulnerable must
have meaningful access to legal protection, if they are to defend their interests against
those to whom the state has granted the opportunity to profit from their vulnerability.
the provision of health services, not an adjunct or separate service: supra note 89.
96. See E. Mahoney, "Disabling Tenants' Rights" (1997) 25 Osgoode Hall LJ. 711; Mahoney considers
the case of a group of "vulnerable adults" who were "relocated" by the landlady of their boarding
house and were more or less prohibited from exercising rights under the Tenant Protection Act, S.O.
1997, c.24 because they had no legal representation.
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VI. CONCLUSION
J.G. was, it must be said, asking for very little: only the chance to explain as effectively
as she could why she should be able to keep her children. But the legal system requires
that she do that in a certain way in a certain environment. Legal counsel mediates Ms
G's story and the legal structure into which it must fit. On its face, Ms G. and others
in her position will be entitled to that interpreter of the law and of the norms of the
system which will decide such an important aspect of their life. Even so, one is left
thinking that the Court missed an opportunity in G.(J.) to say more about the need for
civil legal aid. Nevertheless, any legal aid plan which does not fund legal representa-
tion for child protection proceedings of any kind or for similar kinds of claims will be
vulnerable to challenge. The parameters of this case can be pushed to cover civil
proceedings in which any state action can be identified, now that the main step has
been taken. This is welcome because it does constitutionalize the entitlement to legal
counsel beyond the criminal context. At the same time, the approach taken in G.(J.)
suggests that any further development will be on a slow and individual case by case
basis. Consequently, G.(J.) also suggests that it time for the Court to reconsider its
approach to section 7 and to develop an interpretation more in keeping with the liberal
and generous interpretation appropriate for the Charter
